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PREFACE 
The study on Advanced Missions Safety was  performed a s  Task  2 . 6  of 
Contract NASw -230 1 entitled, "Advanced Space P r o g r a m  Analysis and 
Planning. I '  The task  consisted of th ree  subtasks: 
Subtask 1 - Space Shuttle Rescue Capability (Vol. 11- 1 and Vol. III- 1 ) 
Subtask 2 - Experiment Safety (Vol. 11-2 and Vol. 111-2) 
Subtask 3 - Emergency Crew Trans fe r  (Vol. 11-3) 
Each subtask i s  a n  independent entity and is independent of the other two 
subtasks. 
The resu l t s  of this study a r e  presented in  three  volumes. 
Volume I: Executive Summary Report presents  a coincise 
review of the resu l t s ,  conclusions, and 
recommendations for a l l  t h ree  subtasks.  
Volume 11: Technical Discussion is in  three  pa r t s ,  each 
presenting a comprehensive discussion of a 
single subtas k. 
Volume 111: Appendices contains detailed supporting analysis 
for Subtasks 1 and 2 and is of in t e res t  pr imar i ly  
to the technical specialist .  
The Advanced Missions Safety Task  was  sponsored by NASA Headquarters 
and was  managed by the Advanced Missions Office of the Office of Manned 
Space Flight. Mr.  Herber t  Schaefer,  the study monitor,  provided guidance 
and counsel that significantly aided the total  effort. Mr.  Charles W. Childs 
of the Safety Office, NASA Headquarters ,  and Miss  Ruth N. Weltmann of the 
Aerospace Safety Resea rch  and Data Institute, NASA-Lewis, also provided 
valuable comments and suggestions. 
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i. INTRODUCTION 
Three  separa te  studies were  per formed under the general  category of 
"Advanced Missions Safety. " Each dealt  with a separa te  i ssue ,  was  a se l f -  
contained effort, and was  independent of the other  two studies. The studies 
a r e  titled: 
A. Space Shuttle Rescue Capability 
B. Experiment Safety 
C. Emergency Crew Trans fe r  
A separa te  discussion of each study follows. 
2 .  RELATIONSHIP TO FUTURE NASA PROGRAMS 
2 . 1  SPACE SHUTTLE RESCUE CAPABILITY 
This study contributes prel iminary information on using the Space Shuttle 
for  space rescue  miss ions  in the t ime f r a m e  when men will be placed in 
orbi ts  which a r e  beyond the design capability of the basic Space Shuttle. 
EXPERIMENT SAFETY 
The safety guidelines developed in  this study provide safety inputs into 
a l l  phases of the in-space experiment p rogram associated with the Space 
Shuttle, with par t icular  emphasis on the integration of experiments and the i r  
equipment with Experiment Modules and the Orbi ter  and their  potential 
hazardous interactions.  
2 . 3  EMERGENCY CREW TRANSFER 
The output of this study i s  intended to provide basic data for  pla.nning 
in-space emergency equipment fo r  t r ans fe r  of men f r o m  a d i s t r e s sed  vehi- 
c le  to  a space rescue  vehicle. 
3. SPACE SHUTTLE RESCUE CAPABILITY 
3. i STUDY OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this  study was  to examine the feasibility of extending the 
rescue  mission utility of the Space Shuttle beyond its presently planned 
performance capabity. 
3 .2  SCOPE 
Three  general  methods of increasing the basic Shuttle capability were  
examined : 
a. Increased propellant loading a t  lift-off (cargo bay tank) 
b. Orbital  refueling 
c. Shuttle-launched Tug (single Tug and tandem Tugs) 
Four  different Space Shuttle configurations were  initially analyzed. Only the 
resu l t s  of an add-on effort which considered the configuration specified in  
the Space Shuttle R F P ,  released af ter  the initial study effort was  completed, 
a r e  reported herein.  
Based on a previous study the weight of a typical rescue  payload was 
assumed to be 10 klb (4.5 t ) .  
RESULTS 
Of the seve ra l  designs examined, the drop tank Orbi ter  configuration a s  
specified i n  the Space Shuttle R F P  provides the best  overal l  rescue  mission 
capability. A summary  overview of the conclusions reached for  this 
configuration is given in  Figure i. 
Cargo Bay Tank 
Increasing the lift-off propellant loading by means  of a cargo bay tank i s  
useful pr imar i ly  i n  low ea r th  orbit .  An additional AV of approx:imately 2 kft/s 
(0.6 km/s )  could be provided for  a due eas t  launch with which the Orbiter 
could r each  an orbi ta l  altitude of about 800 nmi (1, 500 km). 
Orbi te r  to Lunar  Orb i te r  Re turns  Via 
Figure 1, Shuitle Rescue Capability Summary 
Orbital Refueling 
Both lunar  and geosynchronous orbi t  round t r ip s  f rom low ea r th  orbi t  appear 
marginally possible with a 10 klb (4. 5 t )  rescue  payload by refueling the 
Orbi ter  drop tank in  low ea r th  orbit .  Fur ther ,  if Orbiter refueling i s  corn- 
bined with an added cargo bay propellant tank, some maneuvering capability 
in  the rescue  orb i t  i s  achieved. 
The refueled Orbiter can  even deliver a 70 klb (32 t) payload intlo either lunar 
o r  geosynchronous orbi ts .  The remaining AV i s  not sufficient, however, to 
r e tu rn  the Orbiter and payload to low ear th  orbit .  Since the Orbi ter  is not 
designed for d i rec t  reent ry  f r o m  such high energy miss ions ,  an al ternate  
ear th  r e tu rn  technique such a s  multiple-pass grazing reent ry  must  be con- 
sidered. Current  Orbiter t he rma l  protection sys t em designs and radiation 
shielding appear adequate for multiple -pass grazing reent ry  without limiting 
the c rossrange  capability. 
Orbi ter  -Launched Tug 
Carrying a fueled Tug with an attached r e scue  payload (which could be 
manned) i n  the Orbi ter  cargo bay and launching it f r o m  a 100 nmi (185 km) 
orb i t  would be useful for :  
@ Low ea r th  orb i t  emergencies  
With a Tug AV of about 22 kf t /s  (6 .7  krn/s) and 
carrying a 10 klb (4.5 t )  emergency payload, a round 
t r ip  capability to a 12, 000 nrni (22, 000 km)  orbi t  i s  
attainable. 
Lunar /geosynchronous orb i t  emergencies  
The Tug has a round t r i p  capability of < 5  klb ( 2 . 2  t). 
With a Tandem Tug which requi res  two Shuttle 
launches,  the emergency payload could be ra i sed  t o  
10 klb (4. 5 t). 
CONCLUSIONS 
F o r  use  a s  a space rescue  vehicle, the Space Shuttle performance capability 
can be  increased  by any of the t h r e e  methods considered: 
0 The addition of a cargo bay tank is a relatively simple 
method and would r e su l t  i n  a performance capabi1it.y to 
a n o r b i t  of about 800 nmi (1,500 km) .  
0 Orbital  refueling could extend the Orbi ter  performance 
capability to lunar  and geosynchronous orbi ts .  It i s  unlikely, 
however, that this augmentation mode would be acquired 
solely to mee t  rescue  miss ion  requirements .  In  addition 
to the l a rge  cost  of the additional equipment involved, the 
t ime required to refuel  the Orbiter main propellant tank i s  
excessively long for  a r e scue  mission. About 30 Shuttle 
flights would be required for  a single refueling operation 
unless  a propellant depot w e r e  available o r  the empty 
Orbi ter  tank could be exchanged for a fueled tank a l ready 
in  orbit .  
e8 Carrying a Tug and re scue  payload in  the cargo bay for  
launch f r o m  low ea r th  orb i t  could be useful for  emergencies  
in  low ea r th  orbit .  The payload capacity is insufficient, 
however, for  lunar  and geosynchronous orbi ts .  Suc:h 
miss ions  would requi re  a Tandem Tug configuration. 
4. EXPERIMENT SAFETY 
4. 1 STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of the study were:  
a. Analyze the potential emergency situations created by 
carrying experiment equipment aboard a Space Shuttle. 
b. Identify safety guidelines and requirements  for  eliminating 
o r  reducing hazards  to the Space Shuttle and its crew which 
m a y  be introduced by the experiment equipment and i t s  
operation. 
4 . 2  STUDY SCOPE 
The safety analysis considered a l l  miss ion  phases f r o m  the 1aun.ch pad 
through to deployment, f r e e  flight (where applicable), experiment operations,  
re t r ieva l ,  and final disposition. Also considered were  the interactions of 
the experiment equipment and experiment operations with Experimerrt 
Modules (Pal le t ,  MSM, RAM, Sortie Module, etc. ) and the Space Shuttle, 
other paylo ads within the Orbi ter  cargo bay, and associated satell i tes.  
The analysis was  based on experiments identified in the Blue Book and in 
the SOAR study. 
4 . 3  DISCUSSION 
The l a rge  variety of experiments aboard an Orbi ter  on any one flight could 
crea te  many potential hazards  because of the interaction between the Experi-  
ment  Equipment and i t s  operations,  Accommodation Modules, experimenters ,  
and Shuttle Orbi ter  operational equipment and crew. Malfunctioning 
Experiment Equipment presents  d iscre te  hazard sources;  the potential 
hazards  created by them could propagate to other  Experiment Equipment 
and supporting equipment and to operational equipment of the Accornrno dating 
Module and the Orbiter.  
In contrast to safety considerations in experiment ground facilities, which 
emphasize experimenter safety f i rs t ,  an experiment laboratory in space 
has to give prime safety considerations to the operational functioning of the 
Orbiter to enable a safe crew return. 
In ground facilities, hazardous experiments a r e  separated frorrl other 
experiments and personnel. For  space operations, experiment equipment 
of a hazardous nature may be densely packed, because flight costs a r e  high, 
For  this reason, special attention has to be given to potential interferences 
and interactions such a s  overheating, permeating fields ( R F  transmit ters ,  
X-ray machines, high-powered magnets, l a s e r s ,  etc. ), spurious signals, 
high-voltage potential (TV, inverters ,  pulsers ,  etc. ), etc. Such interaction 
between experiments could lead to a malfunction of otherwise safe equipment 
and might influence the safe operation of the Orbiter. 
Many hazardous materials  on board the Orbiter,  such a s  cryoglenics, s to r -  
able propellants, film, processing chemicals, plastic and nuclear emulsions, 
toxic serums,  radioisotopes, etc. , will add to the hazards of some of the 
experiments and the crew. The location of such mater ia ls  in  relation to any 
experiment o r  Orbiter equipment, a s  well a s  the access and egress  routes 
fo r  the experimenters,  requires serious consideration. 
In contrast to most  ground laboratories,  the Orbiter s tructure outside the 
crew compartment can withstand a p ressure  difference of only (a few psi. 
Therefore, experiments with components of a potential high-pressure o r  
explosive source (gas bottles, liquid and solid propellants, etc. ) have to be 
constrained, shielded, o r  safed to prevent inadvertent activation by other 
exper irnents. 
Toxic and hazardous materials  (bacteria,  isotopes, biologicals,, mercury ,  
processing chemicals, etc. ), especially in gaseous o r  powder form,  which 
present  a health hazard to men o r  which can damage mater ia ls  o r  equipment, 
m a y  have to be double-contained with special  environmental conditioning 
sys tems,  a s  complete cleanup of contaminants in  zero gravity might be 
imp0 s sible to achieve. 
Many of the experiments being considered have high-voltage components 
(TV, imaging tubes, inver te rs ,  pu lsers ,  etc. ) with the potential of f i r e ,  
shock, etc. , which could r e su l t  i n  injury to the c rew and damage to the 
Orbiter.  The c l ea r  indication of the operational ctatus of such components 
is required. In case  of emergency, provisions for  automatic sliutdown and 
rapid discharge af ter  shutdown a r e  required. Ground circui ts  should be 
avoided. 
Emergency situations resulting f rom experiment equipment and/or i t s  
operation that could lead to Orbi ter  damage and/or lo s s  requi re  immediate 
a s ses smen t  by the Orbi ter  crew. This can  be accomplished by providing 
warning signals in  the c rew compartment which indicate the hazard,  i t s  
severi ty ,  its location, etc.  Normal  procedures  provide the commander 
with the authority to determine actions necessa ry  to save the Orbi ter  and 
crew. This may  involve sacrificing an  experiment,  an Experiment Module, 
and perhaps even a c rew member ,  if the emergency war ran t s  such dras t ic  
means  and the Orbiter and mos t  of the c rew can be saved by such an action. 
Radiation sources  such a s  radioisotopes, X-rays,  l a s e r s ,  etc. which can 
cause injury to m e n  and damage to mater ia l s ,  equipment, expel-iments, and 
the operation of the Orbi ter  should be c lear ly  marked ,  monitored, shielded, 
and located so that no interference i s  possible under normal  operating 
conditions. Emergency procedures  and plans should be preparcxi and 
executed, if an emergency o r  malfunction i s  indicated by the monitoring 
system. 
Where a number of experiments might be operated simultaneously, safety 
procedures  should consider not only single experiments but also the 
interactions of a l l  experiments to be operated a t  any one t ime. A cer tain 
shutdown procedure might be safe for one experiment but might c rea te  an  
emergency situation in  another experiment,  thus endangering the Orbiter 
and crew. 
In the case  of hazardous experiment equipment, such a s  l a s e r s ,  combustors,  
furnaces,  propellant t ransfer  sys tems,  and X-rays,  there  should be a t r ade -  
off study made to determine whether the experiment should be conducted 
within o r  exter ior  to the Experiment Module o r  Orbiter.  If located within 
the Experiment Module, the experimenter  can closely supervise  the experi-  
ment  operations and ensure  compliance with a l l  safety procedur~es.  I f  
located exter ior  to the Module o r  Orbi ter ,  docking o r  EVA m a y  be required. 
Such operations also have safety implications, such a s  collisions and EVA 
hazards.  
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The safety effort re lated to experiments associated with a Space Shuttle 
Orbi ter  requi res  an integrated sys tem approach which covers  essentially 
three  sys tem levels : 
a. Experiment Equipment design 
b. Integration of Experiment Equipment within an 
Accommodation Module 
c. Integration of an Accommodation Module within the 
Orbiter 
Emphasis  mus t  be given i n  a l l  these interrelated safety efforts to potential 
experiment operational hazards  due to synergis t ic  interactions of the 
Experiment Equipment with other Experiment Equipment and with Orbi ter  
systems.  
The  study identified 164 general  and specific experiment Safety Guidelines 
.which cover the ent i re  experiment mission spec t rum f r o m  the launclh 
pad through deployed experiment operations to Orbi ter  landing. For  
visibility each Guideline i s  identified a s  to its applicability to: 
Q Experiment and/or Experiment Equipment 
@ The interface of the Experiment to the Orbiter 
o r  the Accommodation Module 
Q The Orbiter 
Q Experiment Modules 
@ Four a r e a s  of the miss ion  spec t rum 
Locational Safety Guidelines have been identified i n  addition to the conven- 
tional design and operational Safety Guidelines. This new classification i s  
needed for experiment safety because Experiment Equipment will be devel- 
oped i n  many cases  long before i t s  location on board an Orbi ter  flight has  
been established, and the integration effort in  levels (b) and ( c )  mentioned 
above m a y  be influenced by potentially hazardous interface conditions 
stemming f r o m  the Experiment and /or  its equipment. 
These Safety Guidelines will be useful a s  checklists and a s  inputs into the 
design, integration, and planning phases of Space Shuttle experiments.  Such 
inputs a r e  needed fo r  obtaining "Man-Compatibilitytt between Errperirnents 
and their  operation with the Orbiter.  
These a r e  init ial  safety guidelines, commensurate  with the cur rent  l imited 
definition of Experiments.  As the level  of definition of Experiments 
increases ,  the guidelines should be expanded to be consistent with the specific 
equipment to be used. 
5. EMERGENCY CREW TRANSFER 
5 . 1  STUDY OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this  study was to  a s s e s s  and compare the relative effectiveness 
of possible rescue  configurations for  emergency crew t ransfer  f rom a Dis - 
t r e s sed  Vehicle (DV) to a Space Rescue Vehicle (SRV) while the two vehicles 
a r e  not docked to each other ( s e e  Figure 2) .  Fac tors  such a s  unique capa-  
bilitie s ,  limitations, ease  and speed of use,  applicability, and clevelopment 
and procurement cos ts  were  to  be considered. 
REGION OF ' SPACE RESCUE 
INTEREST VEHlCLE / (SF2 V) 
Figure 2. Schematic Diagram of Region of Study Interest  
5 . 2  SCOPE 
The evaluation of emergency t ransfer  means was l imited to the following 
operations: 
a EVA 
fa Space Shuttle Orbi ter  
c4 Space Station 
c4 Re sea rch  Applications Module (RAM) 
Character is t ics  of the t ransfer  means  were  based on information in the avail-  
able l i te ra ture .  
The feedback effect of the t ransfer  device on the design and cost of the space-  
c raf t  on which it will be ca r r i ed  and/or  used was beyond the scope of this study. 
DISCUSSION 
5 . 3 . 1  General 
The assessment  made in this study was essentially subjective. Costs were 
estimated f rom available conceptual designs. In addition, the effect of a 
t ransfer  device on the parent spacecraft  was not considered. In spite of such 
limitations, a reasonably valid indication was obtained of the capability prefer  - 
ence among t ransfer  devices a s  a function of dollar expenditure. 
Emergency t ransfer  devices identified in ea r l i e r  studies generally fal l  into 
one of the following categories:  
e Unassisted EVA 
An individual crewman wearing a p ressu re  suit 
and moving under self power. 
a Augmented Unassisted EVA 
An individual crewman wearing a p ressu re  suit 
and moving by means of a separate impulse source 
under his  control. 
e Assisted EVA 
A suited DV crewman aided in t raversing the stand- 
off distance by externally provided means  not under 
his control. 
e Pressur i zed  Transfer  Vehicle 
Devices which shuttle between the DV and the SRV 
and c a r r y  an  operating crew plus passengers .  
a Special Purpose Devices 
Devices which can be used for emergency t ransfer  
of personnel f rom the DV and the SRV. 
The Pressu r i zed  Transfer  Vehicle category can generally handle the ent i re  
disabled vehicle crew. All other categories can handle only one to two men 
a t  a t ime.  
The features of each category were  characterized, and then the crew 
emergency t ransfer  utility of each category was ranked against selected 
operating c r i t e r i a .  A range of estimated development and man~rfacturing 
cos ts  was a lso  established for each category. 
5 . 3 . 2  Design and Operational Character is t ic  s 
A summary of the design charac ter i s t ics  for typical emergency t ransfer  
devices i s  given in Figure 3,' Except for the P ressu r i zed  Transfer  Vehicle 
(PTV) category, the character is t ics  of each of the five categories  fall into 
a reasonably narrow range. Since significant differences a r e  noted between 
a PTV based a t  a DV and a PTV based a t  an SRV, both subcategories were  
separately identified. 
The operational charac ter i s t ics  of the five general t ransfer  categories a r e  
given in Figure 4. With this  information and that contained in Figure 3, a 
bas is  was established for ranking the relative effectiveness of tlie individual 
t ransfer  categories.  
5 .3 .3  Transfer  Category Comparison 
Although specific c r i t e r i a  can be identified a s  influencing the applicability of 
a t ransfer  category, quantifying these cr i te r ia  i s  largely a subjective process .  
The c r i t e r i a  f rom which the operational effectiveness was established a r e  
given in Figure 5 together with the weighting factors  and the scc~re  for each 
category. 
The most  effective category, although not necessari ly  an ideal solution, was 
rated 10. The leas t  effective category was  rated 2. ( A  completely ineffective 
situation would be scored 0 ,  ) All other categories a r e  scored bletween these 
values according to their  estimated effectiveness. 
By applying the assigned weighting factor for each cr i te r ion  to t:he individual 
category score,  a total rating for each t ransfer  category was established. 

Character is t ic  
Figure 4, Transfer Category Operational Characteristics Summary 

The t ransfer  categories a r e  ranked in Figure 6 according to this total 
weighted score,  normalized to a maximum value of 10. 
Transfer  Category Normalized Score 
P ressu r i zed  Trans fe r  Vehicle 
Based a t  DV 
Pressu r i zed  Transfer  Vehicle 
Based a t  SRV 
Augmented Unassisted EVA I 7 .9  
Unassisted EVA I 5. 8 
Assisted EVA 
Special Purpose Device I 5.5 
5.9 
Figure 6. Rank Based on Operational Effectiveness 
The estimated range for both RDT&E and F i r s t  Unit Manufacturing Cost  a r e  
l isted in ascending plateaus in Figure 7 .  
Trans fe r  devices requiring a new hardware development can be economically 
a s sessed  on the bas is  of their RDT&E cost.  Transfer  devices based on ha rd -  
ware  already available and developed to meet  a non-rescue requirement  can 
be economically a s sessed  on the basis  of their f i r s t  unit manufacturing cost. 
EVA can be involved in a l l  categories and i s  required for most .  If an advanced 
p ressu re  suit i s  developed to meet  non-emergency requirements;, however, o r  
if each spacecraft  i s  equipped with an  individual suit  for al l  personnel, then 
suit cos ts  ought not be a s sessed  against emergency t ransfer  cost.  Therefore,  
data a r e  presented in Figure 7 both with and without p ressu re  suit  costs .  Also 
included in Figure 7 i s  the operational effectiveness rank f rom Figure 6. 
Transfer  Category 
Special Purpose Devices 
Assisted EVA 
Pressurized Transfer 
Vehicle a t  DV 
.l, ,- 
Cost per man 
?1ncludes EVA suit for SRV crewman and IVA suit for DV crewman 
Figure 7 .  Cost Plateau Comparisons 
5 . 4  CONCLUSIONS 
A c r e w  t ransfer  device based a t  a Dis t ressed  Vehicle i s  generally prefer red  
to  one which originates a t  the rescuing spacecraft .  Thus, a P r e s s u r i z e d  
Trans fe r  Vehicle based a t  the Dis t ressed  Vehicle had the best s c o r e ,  How- 
ever ,  since cos ts  increase with t r ans fe r  technique complexity, i t  was concluded 
that Augmented Unassisted EVA (which t r ans fe r s  one to two men. a t  a t ime)  
offers the bes t  solution a t  moderate  cost  for a smal l  c rew.  But i f  a P res su r i zed  
Transfer  Vehicle has  been developed to meet  non-emergency needs,  then i t  i s  
not only operationally p re fe r red  but i t  i s  most  cost effective for  t r a n s f e r r a  
a la rge  crew (>8 crewmen) a s  well. 
Augmented Unassisted EVA will involve an estimated development cost  of 
$25 to $50 million (excluding p r e s s u r e  suit development), whereas a P r e s  - 
surized Trans fe r  Vehicle will have an estimated development cost  of $164 to 
$330 million. If developed for  other,  non-emergency needs,  the f i r s t  unit 
manufacturing cost i s  estimated at $1 to $2 million fo r  Augmented Unassisted 
EVA (carrying 1 o r  2 men) and $9 to $18 million for  a P res su r i zed  Transfer  
Vehicle (capable of carrying up to 15 men).  
The Docking Module fo r  the Apollo-Soyuz Test  P ro jec t  fa l ls  into the Special 
Purpose  Device category and i s  potentially useful for  emergency crew t ransfer .  
